Watching the Denver Nuggets Implode Against the Oklahoma Thunder and Watching them give Up 91 Points to Kevin Durant and Russell Westbrook was more fun than a Man Should be Allowed to Have

The Denver Nuggets run an extremely fast pace offense featuring as many fast break easy scores as they can possibly generate. So far in 2012 the Nuggets are literally the fastest team in the League. Fast breaks in the regular season are mostly completely undefended. In these plays, the Nuggets’ guard races down the court with no chance that any defender will catch up and makes an easy layup or dunk.

An offense based first and foremost on fast breaking results in a handful of extra regular season wins and those extra wins along with an above average number of above average players are generally going to be enough to give the Nuggets a decent playoff slot. But this kind of offense is doomed to fail in the playoffs.

In the playoffs, although the majority of fast breaks still lead to easy scores, some fast breaks now do end up defended with at least a foul. And there are a few fast breaks flat out successfully defended. Specifically, you have in the playoffs what QFTR will call the “playoff fast break prevent foul” where a defender wraps up the guard who is running the fast break as if he was going to make a football tackle. Of course, you can’t actually tackle someone in basketball or the referees will throw the book at you, but wrap up fouling is a perfectly acceptable way to put up at least some defense against the fast break. Both foul shots need to be made for the full two points to be awarded for any fast break which is interrupted by a playoff fast break prevent foul. If one or both free throws are missed, that fast break defense has produced a gain.

But hold on a second, how was there a defender around to commit that foul? Because on a well coached playoff team that is playing the Nuggets, there will be a guard who has been instructed by a coach to be a “fast break defender” and so he has been specifically instructed to anticipate changes of possessions and to race back on defense as fast as possible for as many of the changes of possessions as possible. In other words the guard is told to be still partly a defender even when he is on offense at the other end of the court. He has been told to forget about offensive rebounding. He has been told to forget about moving closer to the basket than the foul line. This guard ends up being the equivalent of a free safety in football. This strategy cuts down on the number of completely undefended fast breaks.

Note however that there is a rule in NBA basketball that in effect defends the fast break from what you might call cheap defenses against it. If a defender does a wrap around or any other type of foul while in a trailing position relative to the fast breaking guard than he will be called for a continuation foul. The penalty for this foul is that the fast break basket is counted (making the foul worthless to the defense). Therefore, the guard defending the fast break must commit the foul before the fast breaking guard is ahead of him in relation to the fast break basket.

Too bad there is no NBA rule that outlaws cheap George Karl offenses, laugh out loud.

But more important than the limited ramping up of defending against fast breaks is the reduction of the number of them. In the playoffs, the Nuggets are prevented from generating as many fast breaks as they do in the regular season. In the playoffs, Nuggets’ opponents get more serious and smart about preventing fast breaks and about defending them when they do get generated. Ball handling guards of Nuggets’ opponents are on high alert for reach-in steals and they try to avoid any overly flashy and overly risky dribbling, cutting, or passing which can easily lead to a team like the Nuggets getting too many steals and too many easy fast break scores. Forwards who in general are more prone to having the ball stolen are advised by coaches to reduce how much dribble-moving they do against Nuggets guards who go all out to generate steals. Those forwards are advised to leave the ball movement to guards who when they concentrate can move the ball without turning it over a lot even against the Nuggets’ guards who are on the lookout for every steal opportunity. In other words, one of the major things you do to defend against the Nuggets’ stealing and fast breaking is to cut down on the number of steals and fast breaks they get by establishing and enforcing “rules of the road” for how the ball is going to be handled and for who is going to be doing what with regard to handling the ball.

Whereas, in the regular season, a much more lax attitude prevails regarding ball handling, prevention of steals, prevention of fast breaks, and defending fast breaks, and so the Nuggets can and do get substantially more steals, fast breaks, and easy scores during the regular season than they do in the playoffs.

WHO GAINS FROM THE NUGGETS’ FAST BREAK SCAM?
So year after year after year, Stanley and Josh Kroenke, George Karl, and the Nuggets run what amounts to a scam played against the unsuspecting public. For those who don’t already know, Stanley Kroenke and his son Josh own the Denver Nuggets and George Karl is the head coach of the Nuggets. These are the beneficiaries of the scam.

The scam produces a handful of extra regular season wins and these together with an above average number of above average players allow the Nuggets to get some kind of a playoff slot. The public is fooled into thinking that the Nuggets are better than they are and that the Nuggets have a really good chance to win at least one playoff series. This in turn increases ticket and merchandise sales. Ticket and merchandise sales are also increased because fast breaks are proven crowd pleasers. So year after year, as a result of the whole process, extra money is put into the owners’ pocket. And all of these things tend to increase the worshipping of George Karl.

The players are more or less in the dark about this, meaning they are mostly a part of the unsuspecting public. But when a player remains on the Nuggets for many years eventually they may start to see through the whole dismal scheme. Carmelo Anthony quit the team when he started to suspect that the Nuggets can not possibly ever win The Quest for the Ring by running strategies and tactics that work in the regular season to a limited extent but backfire in the playoffs. It’s unknown to what extent J.R. Smith figured this scheme out and, in any event, he quit the Nuggets first and foremost because he was being denied deserved playing time by George Karl.

By the way, if you are wondering why Quest for the Ring (QFTR) seems to be obsessed with the Nuggets, we started out as a Nuggets site and graduated from that to become a full scale pro basketball Site, covering predominantly the NBA League, in the summer of 2008. QFTR is an Internet Site with the primary mission of explaining exactly how playoff games are won and lost. Visitors to QFTR get very valuable basketball information at no charge that they were not supposed to know both regarding winning and losing and regarding numerous other basketball and NBA subjects.

DURANT AND WESTBROOK COMBINE FOR 91 POINTS AGAINST THE NUGGETS
On Sunday, February 19 2012 in Oklahoma City, in a game that will be remembered forever here at QFTR, the Nuggets lost to the Oklahoma Thunder in one overtime period 124-118. Note that neither team played the day nor night before this game so unusual fatigue was not a factor.

Thunder small forward Kevin Durant, who is obviously is among the best four or five players in the League, scored a new career record of 51 points in this game. Durant was 5 of 6 on threes, 14 of 22 on twos, and 8 of ten on free throws. Durant also made 8 rebounds and 4 steals and he committed only one foul in 45 minutes.

Combo guard Russell Westbrook also had one of the best games of his career. He scored 40 points in total consisting of 3 of 6 on threes, 13 of 23 on twos and 5 of 5 on free throws. Westbrook also made 9 assists and one block, and he committed only two turnovers and two personal fouls in 44 minutes.

Meanwhile, not to be outdone, power forward Serge Ibaka, one of the very best defenders in the League but also a very surprisingly good offensive player, scored 14 points consisting of 6 of 7 on twos and 2 of 4 on free throws. So Ibaka’s scoring was as efficient as you can get. Even more importantly, Ibaka made 15 rebounds and an astonishing 11 blocks in 41 minutes playing time. Despite aggressively defending the paint against a huge number of Nuggets’ drives during those 41 minutes, Ibaka was called for only four fouls during those 41 minutes.

The bottom line is that the three Thunder superstars all had career nights; it was a game for the ages for the Thunder and their fans.

GEORGE KARL’S ASININE CLAIM REGARDING NOT NEEDING A MAJOR SUPERSTAR TO WIN THE QUEST FOR THE RING
The massive performances of Durant, Westbrook and Ibaka reminded QFTR of a ridiculous claim that George Karl recently made.

The following discussion uses terms from the Real Player Ratings. Here is the complete RPR evaluation scale which will help you to fully understand the discussion that follows:

REAL PLAYER RATINGS EVALUATION SCALE FOR SEASONS
Perfect Player for all Practical Purposes / Major Historic Super Star 1.100 and more
Historic Super Star 1.000 1.099
Super Star 0.900 0.999
A Star Player / A well above normal starter 0.820 0.899
Very Good Player / A solid starter 0.760 0.819
Major Role Player / Good enough to start 0.700 0.759
Good Role Player / Often a good 6th man, can possibly start 0.640 0.699
Satisfactory Role Player / Generally should not start 0.580 0.639
Marginal Role Player / Should not start except in an emergency 0.520 0.579
Poor Player / Should never start 0.460 0.519
Very Poor Player 0.400 0.459
Extremely Poor Player and less 0.399

It is common knowledge that following the decisions of Carmelo Anthony and J.R. Smith to quit the Nuggets (and to a lesser extent following the quasi retirement of Kenyon Martin) the Nuggets are in general now a team characterized by few superstars and by perhaps zero historical superstars (also known as major superstars).

Neither Carmelo Anthony nor J.R. Smith have ever qualified as historical superstars overall, without regard to position, using the scale above. But Carmelo Anthony qualified as an historical superstar as a small forward (using a scale custom designed for that position) in his last season with the Nuggets (ironically). J.R. Smith has never qualified as an historical superstar even when you use the shooting guard scale. J.R. Smith has never been higher than a high end star or a low end superstar even when you use the shooting guard scale (but note that Smith ranks higher than the general public thinks).

To be exact, the small forward scale runs .055 less than the above general scale and the shooting guard scale runs .065 less. So a small forward qualifies as an historical superstar if he has a RPR of at least .945 and a shooting guard qualifies as an historical superstar if he has a RPR of at least .935.

Among the current Nuggets, technically and strictly speaking, Nene will probably qualify as an historical superstar this year and Ty Lawson and Andre Miller will probably be fairly high up in the plain superstar range and one or both of them could possibly qualify as an historical superstar.

But the point I am trying to make and that everyone has to agree with is that it is indisputable that the Nuggets do not have any STRONG AND DEFINITE historical superstars whether you look at the overall scale or the position-specific scales. Or, in other words, the Nuggets no longer have any of the "very best players in the NBA" whether or not you look at players overall or look at them from a position perspective. A few years ago they had three: Allen Iverson, Marcus Camby, and Carmelo Anthony. And now they have none.

But on the other hand, the Nuggets do have more than their share of major role players, solid starter / very good players, stars, and plain superstars.

Assuming that the Nuggets do in fact have zero historical superstars or maybe one who just barely qualifies, the question then arises: Can this type of team compete in the playoffs against teams like the Oklahoma Thunder that do definitely have stong and definite historical superstars like Kevin Durant and Russell Westbrook?

George Karl, who is never shy about speaking out in defense of whatever mess he has caused (and about creating the impression that it’s not a mess) was quoted just before this season began that he thinks that it is a myth that teams need to have at least one major (historical) superstar in order to win The Quest for the Ring. He cited the 2004 Detroit Pistons as a team that won the Quest with no major superstar. Once again, as in countless times before, we caught Karl making asinine claims.

First of all, it is at least virtually and most likely mathematically impossible for a team with no major or historical superstars to win The Quest for the Ring. The pattern is obvious and the correlation is extremely high: teams with at least one and usually with two or three major, historical superstars are the ones that emerge from the grueling playoffs to become champions. It’s not enough to have three or four players who are about as good as Danilo Gallinari, an ordinary superstar. Remember, a lot of people must think that QFTR goes overboard with how many players are called superstars. And remember, plain superstars are not enough for winning the Quest; one or more major superstars are needed. To win the Quest, you need to have rock bottom minimum at least one player who is about as good as Russell Westbrook or Kevin Durant.

THE HISTORICAL SUPERSTARS OF THE 2004 DETROIT PISTONS
As for the 2004 Pistons, they indisputably had one historical superstar that year: Ben Wallace, who was a major superstar due to his defending. It figures that Karl would forget about (or ignore) Wallace, because Wallace has an odd personality and so people who get hung up on personalities (and there are more of them than you think) have never regarded Wallace as an historical superstar in 2004 or in any other year. And of course, Karl gets more hung up on player personalities than anyone so it’s no wonder that he would never consider Ben Wallace to be an historical superstar. But for the record and for emphasis, Ben Wallace was indisputably an historical superstar for the Detroit Pistons when they won the 2004 Quest for the Ring.

And on that team there was another very high quality defender with ironically the same last name: Rasheed Wallace (no relation to Ben Wallace). While not quite as outstanding on defense as Ben, Rasheed was better on offense, so overall Rasheed was roughly as valuable as Ben. So actually, the Pistons had two historical superstars in the year they won The Quest for the Ring. But since both of them qualified as such by just a little bit, and because both of them had personalities that few people liked, neither of them were considered to be major superstars by most of the general public. But again, and for the record, both Rasheed Wallace and Ben Wallace were at least marginal historical superstars for the Pistons in 2004.

And so Karl is dead wrong and is trying to fool you when he claims that the Pistons did not have any historical superstars in 2004. And Karl is dead wrong and he is trying to fool you when he says that a team like the Nuggets is still in the running to win The Quest for the Ring even though Carmelo Anthony and J.R. Smith (and Marcus Camby and Allen Iverson for that matter) are gone. No, neither the Nuggets nor any other team that has zero historical superstars (or just one of them just barely) is in the running to win the Quest unless a massive plague of injuries wipes out most or all of the actual historical superstars on the other teams. Fortunately, that many injuries are essentially impossible.

OKLAHOMA THUNDER 124, DENVER NUGGETS 118, ONE OVERTIME
Getting back to this very interesting game, although both teams were pretty banged up injury wise, in fairness to the Nuggets, they came into this game with a slightly bigger handicap due to injuries than did Oklahoma. The Nuggets were without two of their three best players: Danilo Gallinari and Nene. (Their other best player is Ty Lawson.) They were also without a decent, roughly average two-guard, Rudy Fernandez. Oklahoma was without their better than average point guard Eric Maynor and they were without their average to a little below average two-guard Thabo Sefolosha. Fernandez and Sefolosha more or less offset. And either Gallinari or Nene is largely offset by Maynor, but not both of them. So the Nuggets for this game were in effect handicapped to the approximate extent of one well above average player (Gallinari or Nene).

Watching the Nuggets fall apart in the final minutes of the fourth quarter and in overtime was more fun than a man knowledgeable about basketball should be allowed to have, because exactly what should have happened did happen in this game. To oversimplify while remaining accurate and to state it in one sentence, what happened was that the team that runs an off the deep end offense in order to pick up a few extra regular season wins (mostly against medium and bad teams) imploded when the game in effect shifted into playoff mode. Specifically, the Nuggets had a five point lead with four minutes to go in the fourth quarter and then they had a three point lead with 54 seconds to go but there was no way in hell the Nuggets were going to win this game because as of about the last half of the fourth quarter and throughout the overtime period the game had shifted from regular season mode to playoffs mode. The Nuggets had neither the defense nor the offense needed for when the game switched modes.

Playoff mode is where both the offense and the defense are more aggressive, energetic and smarter. When basketball shifts into high gear, the offense that the Nuggets run is exposed as an absurd over the top one that is doomed to fail. If you don’t already know (and you probably do already know) the key features of the Nuggets’ offense are:

--Generation of as many easy fast break dunks and layups as possible. The fast breaks are generated from steals and from very long passes.

--Over weighting guards driving into the paint for layups or for very short jumpers or for foul shots.

--Under weighting mid-range jumpers, longer jumpers and three point shooting.

These things that the Nuggets predominantly do in the regular season are literally and precisely the opposite of what a playoff offense should emphasize if it wants to win playoff series. If you want to win playoff series, you can not shy away from mid-range jumpers, longer jumpers and three-point shooting. If you want to win playoff series, you can NOT be running guards into the paint all the time thinking they are going to be able to finish against the teeth of paint defenses and thinking that the referees are going to bail those guards out by calling a lot of fouls against the paint defenders. And as we discuss in this and other Reports, if you want to win playoff series, you can NOT be thinking you are going to get a lot of easy fast break scores in playoff series.

Moreover, the Nuggets’ defense is at least as doomed to fail in the playoffs as is their offense. When you run an extremely fast pace offense, the actual time of possession becomes lopsided in favor of the other team. This puts a big and unnecessary extra burden on your defense. So for example in the case of the Nuggets, the Denver defenders might have to be defending for roughly 28 minutes in a 48 minute playoff game whereas the defenders of the other team have to be defending for only around 20 minutes (and it could be even a little more lopsided than that).

But remember, the Nuggets’ defenders, like all playoff defenders, have to be more aggressive, energetic, and smarter than they were in the regular season. Now put two and two together: in order to have a good chance to win playoff series, the Nuggets have to expend far more energy and effort on defending than the other team does (because of the lopsided time of possession breakdown). This extra burden directly and negatively affects the ultimate performance of the defense and it indirectly and negatively affects the ultimate performance of the offense.

By contrast, a slow team can ramp of defending more easily and dependably simply because it has to defend for much less actual time during playoff games because it has used up more than half of the game time while it is on offense. Obviously, you don’t have to worry about high level playoff defending while you possess the ball on offense.

In case you don’t know, it’s easy for anyone including yours truly to write about how defenses “ramp up” in the playoffs, but it’s not so easy to actually do it. There is truly a huge amount of effort and smarts involved with properly ramping up defending in playoff games.

So the Nuggets (and all other ridiculously fast paced teams) are in the hole from the get go because they have to try to have ramped up defending for a lot more time and for a much greater percentage of the game time than the other teams do. What actually happens in many if not most playoff games is that even if they ramp up their defense for most possessions in the first half, in the second half, in many possessions the defending inevitably lapses back down to the softer defending you see in the regular season. In the playoffs, great offenses can fairly easily score against defenses that are not ramped up.

One thing that literally happens is that the Nuggets’ defenders eventually get a little demoralized about the fact that the actual time they are defending is much greater than the actual time that their opponent is defending because the Nuggets are stupidly trying to win playoff games with a lot fast breaking and because the Nuggets are stupidly having their guards over weight driving into the paint instead of establishing an extensive and quality passing game.

THE IMPLOSION OF THE NUGGETS ON FEBRUARY 19 IN OKLAHOMA CITY
Late in the fourth quarter and even more so in the overtime period, the Nuggets; offense completely imploded. The Thunder shifted into playoff defending mode and the Nuggets’ offense could not even begin to function when that happened. For the Nuggets, it was actually worse than in the actual playoffs, because there was the shock effect when the game shifted from regular season mode to playoffs mode.

When the Nuggets were called on, in order to win this “playoff game,” to do more than their usual fast breaking and driving into the paint looking for porous defending and foul calls, they simply could not produce or function. They were not prepared with a good quality passing game and they were not prepared with a decent perimeter jump shooting game (either twos or threes). The Nuggets were not really prepared with any kind of “slightly organized” offense that QFTR states is necessary to win the Championship. They were not prepared with an offense that has offensive identity, which means they did not have their point guards as the ones responsible first and foremost for making plays. Instead, George Karl foolishly believes that all the players in general are about equally responsible for keeping the passing game going and for making plays.

To give credit where it’s due, the Karl approach on making plays produces a lot of sheer assists and a lot of sheer points, and the Nuggets are in fact the number one team in the NBA for both assists and for points! But once again, as with so many other Karl strategies, this works better in the regular season than it does in the playoffs. In the playoffs, when the point guards are not PRIMARILY responsible for keeping the passing game going and for making plays, this reduces the quality of the offense and makes it much easier for those ramped up defenses to stop the Nuggets from scoring.

So while they led the game much of the way, by as many as 14 points in fact, when the game shifted into playoffs mode the Nuggets imploded. Late in the fourth quarter and in overtime, the key Nuggets offensive players looked kind of nervous and awkward. Embarrassingly, Andre Miller was called for travelling not once but twice in the overtime. And in a shot that would have won the game in regulation time, Ty Lawson looked extremely (and unnecessarily) awkward when he tried to make a fairly open little 14-foot jumper with about a second left in the fourth quarter. True, the shot was attempted with a second left, but still, there was something about that shot that didn’t look right at all. Awkwardness kills jump shooting. Oh well, you know what they say: “The ball doesn’t lie”. So there was overtime.

On defense, the Nuggets were also mostly imploded and lost in the last few minutes of the fourth quarter and in overtime. Late in this game the Nuggets lacked key things needed for a playoff caliber defense: they lacked confidence, resolve, and they also lacked enough defensive intelligence. But to be fair, with no Nene, it was understandable they would be lacking in confidence that they could effectively guard the paint against Durant, Westbrook, and Ibaka. But overall, as we have explained in detail in this Report, George Karl’s defense was heavily disadvantaged by his crazy and off the deep end offense. In those last minutes, Nuggets defenders were a little confused and they were a little tired (from having to defend all those extra minutes, as we discussed earlier). In playoffs mode games, any quality offense will eat alive a defense that is a little confused and a little tired.

So on defense, the Nuggets looked lost, and obviously they had no answer for either Kevin Durant or Russell Westbrook. The Nuggets get a pass for not being able to deal with Ibaka’s paint offense because with no Nene the Nuggets literally had no player good enough at paint defending to be able to deal with Ibaka’s paint offense. Rookie high draft pick power forward Kenneth Faried might be the answer but of course Karl generally refuses to play rookie and second year forwards for defensive purposes. (And laugh out loud that Faried doesn’t know that Karl apparently discriminates against players whose hair is long dreads.)

MORE FUN THAN ANYONE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO HAVE
Since the Nuggets imploding was exactly what QFTR was thinking would (and should!) happen, it was an extremely enjoyable thing to watch this game and see the Nuggets predictably fall apart. Adding to the fun was that when the Nuggets lost and when on the same evening the Minnesota Timberwolves won (by one single point in a nail biter against that outstanding team the Philadelphia 76’ers) Minnesota moved to within one single game of the Denver Nuggets.

Now game one of the Nuggets / Timberwolves four game regular season series follows the very next night, on February 20. So now, exactly as QFTR hoped for at the beginning of this season, if instead of splitting two games each the Timberwolves or the Nuggets can win this regular season series 3-1 or 4-0, they can probably ensure a playoff slot by doing so and very possibly prevent the loser from making the playoffs at the same time. In other words, just as we hoped for, George Karl faces humiliation from the Minnesota Timberwolves, which was one of the very worst teams in the League only last year. Karl thinks historical superstars are overrated, and now after he has lost to Kevin Durant, Russell Westbrook and Serge Ibaka, let’s see if the same thing happens when Karl plays Kevin Love and Ricky Rubio.

Karl set the stage for Carmelo Anthony and J.R. Smith quitting his team and now he faces humiliation from having the Minnesota Timberwolves take “the George Karl playoff slot” which is supposed to be reserved for Karl to make a fool of himself and lose in the first round. What is the world coming to if Karl does not get his usual opportunity to make a fool of himself and lose in the first round? What if the Nuggets’ scam fails to produce a playoff slot at all? Well, if that happens, that makes basketball an even better sport than you or I thought it was.

Isn’t it way overdue that Karl and the Nuggets not be allowed to bring their scam into the first round of the NBA playoffs?

THE SUMMARY AND THE CONCLUSION FOR OUR STORY
The moral of the story is that from a playoffs perspective the Nuggets’ offense is a scam type offense and it is a low quality offense. And not only that, but the Nuggets’ offense makes it extremely difficult to be prepared defensively for the playoffs and to produce defensively in the playoffs. In general and to sum things up as simply as possible, teams that want to win playoff series need to do less of many of the things the Nuggets do more of than most other teams. And teams that want to win playoff series need to do more of many of the things the Nuggets do less of than most or all other teams do. In other words and to put it even more simply, watch what Karl does and do the opposite!